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JULY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THREE
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions

and great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them the germ of some wider theory,
and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of
the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
CARRIERS-RELATIONSHIP OF PASSENGER AND CARRIER-DEGREES OF CARE. May v. Chicago, B. & Q. Co., et al.1
A consideration of the law concerning the relationship of passenger
and carrier seems to lead one into an impasse.
One starts with the premise that is generally acknowledged. The
Howrelationship of passenger and carrier is the result of a contract
ever, the cases have gone so far that it would appear to be wise to discard
the idea that the relationship is the result of a contract. a
1. May v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
et al.(1920) 284 Mo. 508, 225 S. W. 660.
2. Schepers v. Union Depot Ry. Co.
(1894) 126 Mo. 665, 29 S. W. 712; McCarty v. Railroad (1904) 104 Mo. App.
596, 80 S. W. 7; Devoy v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 197, 91 S.
W. 140; Canaday v. United Railways Co.
(1908) 134 Mo. App. 282, 113 S. W. 88;
Nolan v. Railway Co. (1913) 250 Mo. 602,
157 S. W. 637; Banks v. Kansas City
Rys. Co. (1919) 280 Mo. 227, 217 S. W.
488.
2a. See a discriminating note in 5
Col. L. R. 53: "The questions seem to

be one, not of contract, but of duty to
the public, and this duty to a member
of the public seems to arise from the
concurrence of two facts: (1) that the
person has the intention of entering into
a contract of carriage, and (2) that he
has put himself under the care and control of the carrier in a proper manner."
See also 5 Col. L. R. 546; 7 Col. L. R.
626; Dorsey v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co.
(1900) 83 Mo. App. 528 (free passenger); Sherman v. Hannibal & St. Joseph
R. R. Co. (1880) 72 Mo. 62 (boy on
freight train with consent of conductor);
Muchlhausen v. R. R. (1886) 91 Mo. 332

(55)
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The chief problem arises from a subsidiary proposition. It is generally stated now in Missouri that a carrier owes a passenger "the highest
degree of care".' It seems to make no difference that in other situations
the same court will state that there are no degrees of care."
If the courts in Missouri would follow the last proposition in the
carrier cases the determination of the relationship of passenger and carrier would not be so much of a storm center.
A person sueing in tort is always anxious to establish the relationship
whenever possible. Then (aside from other pitfalls) he can go to the
jury with an instruction that the defendant owed to the plaintiff "the
highest degree of care".' It makes no difference to him that the attempt
to divide care into degrees is unscientific and confusing. He can dwell
at length upon the phrase and he can make the average juror believe that
the defendant owes more than a reasonably careful individual would have
done under similar circumstances. Departure from the last standard is
apt to mean no mental resting place with the average juror this side of
insurance.
The result has been that the relationship of passenger and carrier is
often pushed to an extreme. "The rights and privileges of a passenger
(free passenger); Buck v. The People
Street Ry. Co. (1891)
108 Mo. 179, 18
S. W. 1090 (free passenger); compare
Padget v. Moll & Citizen's Ry. Co.
(1900) 159 Mo. 143, 60 S. W. 121 (newsboy jumping on and off a moving street
car to sell his newspapers not a passenger); McNeill v. Durham & C. R. Co.
(1904) 135 N. C. 682, 47 S. E. 765.
See Lemon v. Chanslor (1878) 68 Mo.
340, I. c. 357, 30 Am. Rep. 799.
See 8
Law Series, p. 29.
3. Devoy v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1905) 192 Mo. 197, 91 S. W. 140.- See
36 Harv. L. R. 340: "This duty is often
said to be to exercise the highest degree
of care.
A more accurate statement is
that great diligence is necessary to fulfill the standard of ordinary care under
the circumstance."
Canaday v. United
Railway Co. (1908) 134 Mo. 282, 114 S.
W. 88 ("A high degree of care looking
to safe carriage."); Spencer v. Transit
Co. (1905) 111 Mo. App. 653, 86 S. W.
593; May v. Railroad Co. (1920) 225 S.
W. 660; Benjamin v. Railroad (1912) 245
Mo. 598, 1. c. 614, 151 S. W. 91; Groshong v. Railways (1909) 142 Mo. App.
718, 121 S. W. 1084 (ordinary care is

below the legal requirement); Austin v.
Railroad Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 397,
130 S. W. 385.
4. McPheeters v. Railroad Co. (1869)
45 Mo. 22 (" - - - there is no difference
between negligence and gross negligence,
the latter being nothing more than the
former with the addition of a vituperative epithet."
This dictum was approved
in .emon v. Chanslor (1878) 68 Mo. I. c.
358, which nevertheless tacitly approved
instructions containing the highest degree
of care doctrine).
See 7 Law Series p.
5; 18 Law Series p. 48; Reed v. Western
Un. T. Co. (1896) 135 Mo. 661, 37 S. W.
904, 34 L. R. A. 592, 58 A. S. R. 609;
Midwest Nati. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis
(1921) 233 S. W. 406, 1. c. 412 (dissenting opinion by Graves, J.: "In Missouri
we have consistently ruled that there are
no degrees of negligence ---. ")
See 25
Law Series p. 56.
5. Imagine the influence of this phrase
on the jurors when a following sentence
informs them that the passengei is only
required to exercise ordinary care.
See
Nolan v. Railroad (1913) 250 Mo. 602,
1. c. 610, 157 S. W. 637.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
come into existence the instant a person offers himself for transportation,
or comes upon the premises of the carrier and pays or tenders the toll
allowed by law for the service demanded, with the intention of embarking
at the first reasonable opportunity.' And the duty which the carrier owes
to the passenger lasts, as a rule, not only until the place of debarkation is
reached and the passenger alights from the vehicle of transportation, but
until he, with due promptness and diligence, leaves the premises of the
carrier maintained for the accommodation and convenience of passengers
T
entering and leaving the place of getting on and off.' Probably the quotation would be generally accepted as a proper statement of the existing
law. Despite this handicap it is believed that the statement can be successfully questioned.
The suggestion is that one is a passenger, at least, as soon as a ticket
is purchased provided he has the proper intention. If one has purchased
a ticket and thereafter decides to abandon his trip does he cease to be
a passenger? If so, may the carrier claim damages for his failure to perfom his contract? Or may the individual obtain a refund of the entire
amount paid?
To change the situation somewhat, if one with a ticket (obtained
while he has the proper intention) change his plan and leave the station
does he cease to be a passenger? If such conduct breaches the contract,
what is the situation if the same individual again changes his plan and
rushes back to the station just in time to take the train he originally intended to use? Does he become a passenger? If so, when and how?
Assuming there is no regulation to the contrary, when does one become a passenger who comes upon a station platform with the intention
of taking the next train and paying cash fare upon the train? If the
answer be as soon as he enters the station platform, could the carrier
sue for a breach if he left before arrival of the train in due course?
If one with a ticket or mileage book enters a station with the intention of taking passage in the ordinary way thereby becomes a passenger
what is his status if by a sudden impulse he gets in between the tender
and baggage car and is thus carried.' If such conduct breaches the contract, is another contract made if the conductor accepts his ticket and
gives him consent to ride in his chosen place?
The difficult cases are relatively few and are apt to be fantastic.'
6. When did the relationship of passenger and carrier first arise under the
facts disclosed in Lindsay v. St. Louis
& H. Ry. Co. (1915) 178 S. W. 276.
7. 54 Central Law Journal 86. See
also 4 Virginia L. R. 143.
8. See Illinois C. R. R. v. O'Keefe
(1898) 168 Ill. 155, 48 N. E. 294. Com-

pare Missouri etc. Ry. v. Williams (1897)
40 S. W. 350, s. c. (1897) 91 Tex. 255,
42 S. W. 855; Martin v. Southern Ry.
(1897) 51 S. C. 150, 28 S. E. 303; 19
Harv. L. R. 259.
9. What is the status of one who has
travelled part of his journey and is waiting at a street intersection with a transfer
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Yet the result seems to be that in theory the status of passenger
and carrier does not exist until the one in charge of the conveyance has
accepted the person desiring to be carried for transportation in that particular conveyance." If this is true, it would seem to follow that the relationship ends when the passenger is discharged from the conveyance."
Certain discriminations must be made concerning the method of carriage,
as railroad, street car, steamboat, etc."
coupon to take another street car?
See
Spencer v. Transit Co.
(1905) 111 Mo.
App. 653, 86 S. W. 593.
10. Lamm, J., in Devoy v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 197 1. c. 210,
91 S. W. 140, apparently expresses the
same idea: "But the law is not so narrow
as to conceive of, nor the eyes of the
law so dim as to see, the relation of
carrier and passenger only when a persou is actually on hoard the car.
To
the contrary, the law deems that relation
to exist when one may be, and treats one
as a passenger who is, properly on the
steps leaving the car or properly on the
steps entering a car as a passenger."
Schaefer v. St. Louis L. & Suburban Ry.
Co. (1894) 128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 231
(attempting to hoard train before it stopped.)
Compare Murphy v. St. Louis etc.
Ry Co. (1891) 43 Mo. App. 342 (hoarding moving train at invitation of conductor); Lindsay v. St. Louis & H. Ry.
Co. (1915)
178 S. W. 276 (whether the
woman had been accepted is a difficult
point; but it seems that the carrier owed
her a duty regardless of the fact of acceptance); Palfrey v. United Railways
(1911) 162 Mo. App. 470, 142 S. W. 773;
Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Cotter (1907)
103 S. W. (Ky.) 279 (boarding a moving train after purchasing ticket at station with intention of taking the patticular
train;
Donovan
v.
Hartford
Street Ry. Co. (1894)
65 Conn. 201
(horse car). See a good article by Joseph
H. Beale, Jr., in 19 Harv. L. R. 250. Perhaps it does not go as far as suggested
in this note but the author is opposed to
4he notion that mere entrarce upon the
premises of the carrier with the intention
of being transported makes one a passenger.
Banks v. Kansas City Railways Co.

(1919) 280 Mo. 227, 217 S. W. 488 ("On
the other hand, if the person indicates
his purpose of taking passage upon a
car, by being on a platform of a regular
stopping place, or by signaling the operator of a car, and the operator by any
act indicates his acceptance of the proposed passenger, the contract of carriage
is complete, and the person thereupon
bcomes a passenger. - - - - So, too, a
car may stop, and a person may fully
intend to board it, yet if he waits until
the car starts, and the avenues of entrance closed, before he accepts the invitation of the carrier, be is not a passenger." Are these statements entirely consistent? The result of the opinion is
commendable.)
11. See 1 Col. L. R. 129, brief review of case where a woman fell from an
unrailed and unlighted platform after
getting off a train. The defendant argued
that she was no longer a passenger because she had determined to remain at the
station *until daylight.
The court responded: "Assuming, but not deciding.
that Mrs. Woods would have had no
right to remain in the station in the
character of a passenger until daylight,
she did have the right to remain there
and enjoy all the privileges and protection due to a passenger for a reasonable
time, under all the circumstances, after
alighting from the car." In other words,
justice could be administered even if she
were

not a passenger.

See 6 Col. L. R. 120; Austin v. Railroad Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 397, 130
S. W. 385 (The most that could be said
for the carrier is that the passenger was
injured in the act of being discharged.
If there was negligence the carrier should
answer.)
12. Scott v. Met. Street Ry. Co.
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Even if this theory found general acceptance with the courts it
would by no means follow that one not a passenger (within the theory)
is without protection. One in a station or upon a platform with a ticket
is entitled to due care. One stepping upon a platform with intention of buying a ticket is also entitled to due care, but it seems erroneous
to say that the latter is a passenger. There is no magic in having a
ticket."5 The responsibility of a carrier to individuals is not bound up
with the relationship of passenger and carrier.'
(1909) 138 Mo. App. 196, 120 S. W. 131
(street car; liability should not have depended upon the status of plaintiff as
passenger); Conway v. Railroad (1911)
161 Mo. App. 81, 142 S. W. 1101 (street
car); Spencer v. Transit Co. (1905) 111
Mo. App. 653, 86 S. W. 593 (plaintiff's
case should not have depended upon his
status as a passenger); O'Mara v. St.
Louis Transit Co. (1903) 102 Mo. App.
202, 76 S. W. 680 (street car).
13. Layser v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co.
(1909) 138 Mo. App. 34, 119 S. W. 1068;
Boling v. Railroad Co. (1905) 189 Mo.
219, 88 S. W. 35; Spencer v. Transit Co.
(1905) 111 Mo. App. 653, 186 S. W. 593
(possession of a transfer ticket considered of no importance); Cornell v. Railroad (1910) 143 Mo. App. 598, 128 S. W.
1021 (ticket not a contract.)
14. Jones v. St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co. (1894) 125 Mo. 666, 28 S. W.
883 (pullman porter "was entitled to the
rights of a passenger - - - ." The court
was apparently careful not to say that
Compare Mellor v.
he was a passenger.)
105 Mo. 455,
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1891)
16 S. W. 849 ("Defendant's duty to him,
so far as concerned safe transportation,
was as a passenger, so far as concerned
his right to safe transit.'! Plaintiff was
a railway mail clerk.); Magoffin v. The
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1890) 102 Mo. 540,
1.c. 543, 15 S. W. 76 (railway mail clerk);
Whitehead v. Ry. Co. (1899) 99 Mo, 263.
11 S. W. 750 (boy on freight train with
consent of agents. "It owed a duty to
him, even on the theory that he was not,
in the full sense of the term, a passenger.")
Adams v. Railroad (1910) 149 Mo. App.
278, 130 S. W. 48 (Person unable to
buy ticket attempted to enter train with-

out exhibiting ticket); Padgitt v. Moll &
Citizens Ry Co. (1900) 159 Mo. 143, 60
S. W. 121 (one not a passenger entitled
to ordinary care); Schepers v. Union Depot Ry. Co. (1894) 126 Mo. 665, 29 S.
W. 279 (dictum that because one is entitled to become a passenger he does not
necessarily occupy that status); McCarty
105 Mo. App. 596,
v. Railroad (1904)
80 S. W. 7 (one boarding street car in
unusual place not a passenger but still
See Galloway
entitled to ordinary care.)
v. Kansas City Rys. Co. (1921) 233 S. W.
385.
It is submited that a proper recognition of this fact would have obviated the
apparent difficulty which caused a reversal in Nolan v. Railway Co. (1913) 250
Mo. 602, 157 S. W. 637.
"In
the absence of such invitation
pasbecome
a
did
not
Mathews
senger, and defendant owed him no
other duty than that of using ordinary
care to avoid injuring him afier it discovered, or should have known, that voluntarily and uninvited, he had placed
himself on the car in a position of danger."
Mathews v. Railway Co. (1911)
156 Mo. App. 715, 1. c. 723, 137 S. W.
1003.
See Illinois Cent. R. v. Cotter
(1907) 103 S. W. (Ky.) 279; Speaks v.
179 Mo. App. 311,
Ry. Co. etc. (1914)
166 S. W. 864.
Norfolk & Western R. R. Co. v. Galenliher (1893) 89 Va. 639 (- ... -.
titled to the courtesy and protection due
to a passenger from the moment he
entered upon the premises of the deBut the opinion is
fendant company."
not very clear.)
See 8 Law Series, p. 29; Garrett v.
Transit Co. (1909) 219 Mo. 65, 1. c. 95,

60
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May v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. et al." is a rare case which well presents the difficulty. The trial court instructed that the defendant company and the defendant conductor owed the plaintiff "the highest degree
of care that a very prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances". The Supreme Court of Missouri held the instruction

erroneous because the conductor was under a duty to exercise ordinary
care only. The decision (though written by a learned judge) has been
criticised" as the result of dividing negligence and care into degrees.
There is a more practical aspect. What chance has a common carrier if
a jury is instructed that its agent is only required to exercise the care of
a reasonably prudent man but that it must do something more than that?
Will the average jury stop short of thinking that the carrier is liable in
any event except, perhaps, where the plaintiff negligently contributed to
the injury?
Again, it is submitted that if the courts would cease to instruct in
degrees of care it would be possible to work out the relationship of passenger and carrier on a proper basis. Meanwhile the decisions over the
country are confusing though the Missouri courts in the main have shown
a distinctly conservative tendency.
K. C. S.
WILLS AND PROBATE LAW-EXECUTION-PUBLICATION
-ATTESTING WITNESSES. Ray v. Walker.' W. N. Keener testified
that his father, Elias Keener, expressed a desire to make a will and after
further conversation the father told his son to get one Webb to prepare
the document. Webb was summoned and he brought one Gore with him
Elias Keener, Webb, and Gore were together in a room. The former expressed his wishes and Webb wrote the will.
Webb testified that after the will had been written it was read to
Elias Keener who signed it "in his presence". Then: "Gore and myself
signed the will as witnesses in his presence."
Gore testified by deposition. He remembered the occasion in question. Keener gave directions. Webb wrote the will and ".... .I
was
present while the will was being written". "The will was read to him"
(Keener). By indirection Gore testified that he witnessed the will. This
118 S. W. 68; State ex rel. United Rys.
Co. v. Allen (1922) 240 S. W. 117.
15. May v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. et
al. (1920) 284 Mo. 508, 225 S. W. 660
(opinion by Goode, J.)
16. 34 Harv. L. R. 789: "In defining
the duty of care owed its passengers by
carrier, the courts generally have made
the fundamental error of confusing the

fixed standard of due care with the everyvarying quantum of diligence called for
by the changing circumstances of particular situations."
17. The author acknowledges the valu.
able assistance of John W. Coots, Jr.,
LL. B. U. of Mo., 1923.
1.

(1922)

240 S. W. 187.
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much seems to be admitted in the opinion. There seems to be sufficient
in Gore's deposition to justify a conclusion that he observed Keener sign
his will. But this is denied in the opinion.'
In any event, it does not appear in Gore's deposition that he signed
as a witness in the presence of Keener. Nothing in the testimony of either
Webb or Gore indicates that either of them signed because of any verbal
request from Keener.
The trial court directed a verdict upholding probate of the will. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment and remanded the
cause. The questions of testamentary capacity and undue influence received the major consideration. That will receive no attention here.
Aside from these features the court apparently ruled:' (1) publication is
a necessary step in the formalities necessary to a valid will; and (2) in
addition thereto each of the two necessary attesting witnesses must testify
that he personally was a witness to every step necessary for a formally
valid will; and (3) an intending testator must in some manner request
the signatures of the attesting witnesses.
The justification for this ruling was the Missouri statute, Cyc., and
two Missouri decisions.
The statute is quoted in the opinion. It is as follows:
"Every will shall be in writing, signed by the testator, or by
some person, by his direction, in his presence; and shall be attested
by two or more competent witnesses subscribing their names to
the will in the presence of the testator."'

It is submitted that the language of the statute does not justify the
holding. If any one will take the statute clause by clause and phrase by
phrase, it seems to follow that the requirements were met in the case
under review. (This leaves out the question of the number of witnesses
required to prove the various steps.)
In other words, the will in question was in writing and it was signed
by the testator. The third, fourth, and fifth phrases are alternative provisions and not important here. The will was also attested by two competent witnesses who subscribed their names to the will in the presence
of the testator. It seems unjustifiable to rule that this statute requires:
(1) publication, (2) a request from the intending testator to the intend2. "At the time of the writing and
signing of the will, he knew his children,
grandchildren, and what property he had.
- - Keener had sufficient mental capacity
to furnish any information and transact
any ordinary business at the time and
before the will was signed. 240 S. W.
1. c. 188-189 (Italics supplied).

3. "He does not testify that Keener
signed the will in his presence or acknowledged the signature thereto to be
his" - - - 240 S. W. 1. c. 192.
4. On these points Walker, J., dissented but expressed no opinion. Decision is that of division two only.
5. R. S. Mo. 1919, Section 507.
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ing witnesses that they subscribe their names and (3) that each of the attesting witnesses must testify to the existence of each thing required.
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly unequivocal language of the
statute the writer agrees with Mr: John Chipman Gray that the courts
in reality make the law and that the legislature only furnishes a source
of law. So, it becomes necessary to examine decisions which have interpreted the Missouri statute and similar statutes.
First, is publication required? By publication is meant the process
of making it known that the instrument in the process of execution is a
will as distinguished from any other sort of an instrument! Now, it seems
fairly certain that the decisions under the English statute of frauds,'
and similar statutes, did not require publication.' The uniform attitude
6. Black's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.)
p. 964; Schouler on Wills (3rd ed.) sec.
326.
It seems that the mere fact that the
attesting witnesses "understood" that the
paper was a will is not sufficient for
publication. Moodie v. Reid et at. (1817)
7 Taunt. 355.
Compare Padgett v. Pence (1915) 178
S. W. 205; Withinton et al. v. Withinton
et al. (1842) 7 Mo. 589 ("I am inclined to
believe, that the court committed error
in refusing to instruct the jury, that the
intention of the testator to make a deed,
when he signed the said instrument of
writing, does not prevent the said instru.
ment from being and operating as a will.")
See R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 521.
See Vernon v. Vernon (1905) 69 N. J.
E. 759, 61 Ad. 409.
7. 29 Car II, c. 3 (1676). V. "And
he it further enacted by the authority
aforesaid, that from and after the said
four and twentieth day of June all devises and bequests of any lands or tene.
ments devisable either by force of the
statute of wills, or by this statute, or by
force of the custom of Kent, or the cus.
tom of any borough, or any other particular custom, shall be in writing, and
signed by the party so devising the same,
or by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction, and shall
be attested and subscribed in the presence
of the said devisor b ythree or four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and on none effect."
R. S. Mo. 1919, section 507 seems to

following the English statute in essential requirements.
Nor is publication required under the
later English wills act, which has served
as a model to some extent in this country.
St. 7 Wm. IV. & 1 Vict. c.
26 (1837) XIII: "And be it further enacted That every will executed
in manner hereinbefore required shall
be valid without any other publication
thereof."
8. Gibbs, C. J. in Moodie v. Reid et
al (1817) 7 Taunt. 355 1. c. 361:
"A will, as such, requires no publication; be publication what it may, a will
may be good without it." This was a
dictum because the will was executed under a power that required publication.
Ross v. Ewer (1744) 3 Atkyns 156
(dictum by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke
that publication is necessary.)
Doe v. Burdett (1835) 4 Ad. & El. 1, 1.
c. 12 (Lord Demman for the court of
King's Bench reviewed Moodie v. Reid,
supra, and raised a question as to Gibb's
utterance concerning publication. See also 9 Ad. & El. 936.)
White v. Trustees of the British Muscum (1829) 6 Bing 310 (Three witnesses, none of them saw the testator's signature and only one of them knew what thepaper was). See Wright et al v. Wright
(1831) 7 Bing. 457.
Re Claflin's Will (1902) 75 Vt. 19, 52
Al. 1053, 58 L. R. A. 261 (Good opinion
reviewing many cases). See In re Claftin's Will (1901) 73 Vt. 129, 50 Atd. 815;
Gould v. Theological Seminary (1901) 189
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of courts has been to require no more than is required by the statute which
specifies the formalities in the execution of a will. The statutes of two
states at least have expressly required publication.'
Some of the decisions in Missouri on the question of publication cannot be reconciled with decisions generally in England and the United
States.
The decision relied upon in the case under review is Cravens v. Faulconer.5 It is not an authority on publication. The court had two definite
problems before it and neither concerned the question of publication. The
court, in the case being reviewed, quoted some general language" which
is open to an interpretation that publication is necessary. It is only a
dictum, however. As good a view is that the court in stating that a testator "must do some act declaring it to be his will" only meant that a
testator must do something to make it known that the instrument is his
in the sense that he had done the thing therein specified. Unfortunately,
the term "will" frequently is not used with discrimination. Often when
a court states that one must declare an iistrument to be his will there is
no thought that he must declare it to be a will as distinguished from a
deed, declaration of trust, power of attorney, or any other legal instrument.'" So, in Cravens v. Faulconer the court says: " . .. but the acknowledgment by the testator that the name signed to the instrument is his, or
(Italics supplied).
that the paper is his will, is sufficient."'"
Odenwaelder v. Schorr" is apparently in point and states the law
thus:
"There must be some declaration by the testator that the
paper was his will, and a communication made by him to the witnesses that he desires them to attest it as such. But this need not
be verbal. An act or a sign is enough. If the scrivener says this
Ill.282, 59 N. E. 536; cases cited in
Schouler on Wills (3rd edition) see. 326,
n3.
9. New York and New Jersey.
Schouler on Wills (3rd edition) sec. 326.
See Matter of Moore (1905) 46 Misc.
Rep. 537, 95 N. Y. Supp. 61; Manners
v. Manners (1907) 72 N. J. E. 854, 66
Atl. 583.
10. (1859) 28 Mo. 19.
11. The part quoted is as follows:
"The witnesses must subscribe their
names in the presence of the testator in
order that they may not impose a different will on him, but it is not necessary
that they shall attest the very act and
factum of singing by the testator. Though
he must do some act declaring it to be

his will, no particular form of words is required; and it is uniformly held that it
is not necessary that the testator shall
actually sign his name to the will in the
presence of the attesting witnesses; but
the acknowledgment by the testator that
the name signed to the instrument is his,
or that the paper is his will, is sufficient."
28 Mo. 1. c. 21.
12. See cases cited note 8 supra.
13. It is worthy of notice that the
court took occasion to say that the Missouri statute was based upon the English
statute of frauds. See to some effect Odenwaelder v. Schorr (1880) 8 Mo. App.
458, 1. c. 464.
14.

(1880) 8 Mo. App. 458.
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to the witnesses in the presence of the testator, it will do. The
witnesses must know that it is the will of the testator, and witness it at his request. Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Cravens v. Faulconer, 28 Mo. 21."
5
The Supreme Court of Vermont' pointed out the weakness of this
Missouri decision:
"In support of this construction ofthe statute, Mundy v. Mundy, 15
N. J. Eq. 290, is referred to. But that case was decided under a statute
that expressly required that the instrument should be 'declared to be' the
last will and testament of the testator; so no authority for the holding."
Schierbaum v. Schemme" is not decisive. It does not hold that publication is necessary. The testator and the two witnesses sat at the same
table. The will was entirely read to testator and then was read again
until testator interrupted, saying: "Stop, that will do, that is right."
Surely, under these facts, all will agree with the court that ". . . when he
said that it was right it was equivalent to a formal proclamation that it
was his will . . . " Again, one may ask whether the word "will" is meant
to designate a particular sort of instrument or whether it means only
that a thing has been done.
7
In Beyer v. Hermann" the jury asked the circuit judge whether it
was necessary "to have the will read to witnesses before attesting same".
it is
The answer was in the negative, the appellate court adding "....
unusual and altogether unnecegsary that attesting witnesses to a will
should know the contents of the will".
Ortt v. Leonhardt" is clear cut. The testatrix refused to tell the attesting witnesses the nature of the instrument she requested them to sign.
Nevertheless one of them saw the word "will" in the attestation clause
and both of them were cognizant of the nature of the document trom the
circumstances. The holding was that this was sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the statute. Goode, J., in a separate opinion, with his
usual discernment, pointed out that "most" states did not require publication but his opinion was that previous Missouri opinions had required
publication.
Goode, J., referred to Cravens v. Faulconer and Odenwalder v. Schorr,.
supra. He also cited Grimm v. Titman and Walton v. Kendrick.
In Grimm v. Titman" there seems to have been a sufficient publication. The witnesses were not expressly told that the document was a will

15. In re Claflins Will (1902) 75 Vt.
19, 52 At]. 1053, 58 L. R. A. 261.
16. (1900) 157 Mo. 1, 57 S. W. 526,
80 Am. St. Rep. 604. Moore et al. v.
McNulty et al. (1901) 164 Mo. 111, 64

S. W.
most.
17.
18.
423.
19.

159 seems to contain a dictum at
(1903) 173 Mo. 295, 73 S. W. 164.
(1903) 102 Mo. App. 38, 74 S. W.
(1892)

113 Mo. 56, 20 S. W. 664.
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but both witnesses were requested to sign a paper in front of them and
by reading they became aware that the document was a will. The effect
of the opinion is that the above was a sufficient publication and that an
express declaration was not necessary. It is to be noted, however, that the
court did not discuss whether any publication of any sort is required by

the Missouri statute.
In Walton v. Kendrick' there was an express publication of the will
before all of the witnesses. So, there was no consideration given to that
problem and the case is not an authority as to the necessity of a publication. Martin v. Bowder' is more in point but still no definite consideration was given to the question of publication.
Murphy v. Clancy does not discuss the necessity of publication but
contains a remark that if the witnesses hear the instrument read to the
testator a formal declaration that the paper is testator's will is unnecessary.
Aside from the fact that the witnesses were summoned for the purpose of attesting a will there was nothing to show any publication in
Thomas et al. v. English et al.' It would seem that if publication is to
be required it should come from the testator or from somebody who acts
at least with the tacit approval of the testator. The point was not
definitely considered.
Hughes v. Rader' is a difficult decision to analyse. The testimony
of the two attesting witnesses is set out verbatim and occupies nearly fifty
pages. The testatrix did not expressly publish her will but -her son
summoned the witnesses and they were present while the will was drafted
by him. One witness testified that after the will was drafted it was read
to the testatrix; the other witness did not remember of such an occurrence. The court held this to be the legal equivalent of publication,
quoting from Schierbaum v. Schemme, supra.
In Heinbach v. Heinbach there is enough to satisfy any rational requirement of publication. So, the question of the necessity of it was not
clearly presented. The court stated: "It is only necessary that the parties
understand that he intends it to be his will, that he expects the witnesses
to sign it as such, and that he and the witnesses sign it in the presence of
each other under circumstances showing that they all understand the purpose and effect of the instrument." (Italics supplied). The statement
20. (1894))
872.
21. - (1900)
22. (1914)
W. 915.
23. (1914)
S. W. 1147.
24.' (1904)

122 Mo. 504, 27 S. W.
158 Mo. 379, 59 S. W. 227.
177 Mo. App. 429, 163 S.
180

Mo.

App. 358,

167

183 Mo. 630, 82 S. W. 32.

25. (1918) 274 Mo. 301, 202 S. W.
1123; Cartson v. Lafgran (1913)
250
Mo. 527, 157 S. W. 555 seems sound in
requiring that it be shown that testator
knew that he was executing a will. Otherwise, there would be no showing of a
testamentary intent.
That is different
from publication.
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seems too broad. Surely it cannot be true that the testator must sign in
the presence of the witnesses; nor (under the Missouri statute) that the
witnesses must sign in the presence of each other. Furthermore, there is
a doubt whether there is a publication if the witnesses merely "understand"
that the instrument is a will as distinguished from another sort of instru-

ment.'
Pritchard v. Thomasn is clear enough. Testatrix was asked if she
wished to make a will and she responded in the affirmative. The will
was written in her presence as she dictated. Then it was read over to
her and later she signed. During the whole process of writing and reading the witnesses had been present. The scrivener requested the witnesses
in the presence and hearing of testatrix to sign the will. They complied.
Upon these facts it is easy enough to agree with the court that there was
no failure of proof of "a sufficient publication of the will by testatrix".
But it was not necessary to decide and there is no ruling that publication
is required in Missouri.
In Lohmann v. Lohntannz' the testator made a trip for the particular
purpose of having a will prepared. The will was written in his presence
as he directed and then was read to him. He approved. Two witnesses
were secured and the scrivener said to them in the presence and hearing
of the testator: "Mr. Lohmann would like for you to witness his will."
Then the testator and two witnesses signed. This was held sufficient,
Goode, J., stating:
"As regards publication, allowing for present purposes that
our statutes require it, if the testator, either by words, acts, signs,
or conduct, makes clear to the witnesses that he intends the paper
signed to be his will, this is a publication." (Italics supplied.)
The important thing to notice is that Goode, J., by the words italicized
indicated his belief that a proper interpretation of the Missouri statute
would eliminate any question of publication.
Cone v. Donovan2" is a case where publication in the true sense was
important. In form the paper was a letter and there was nothing in the
nature of an attestation clause except the words, "Signed in the presence
of" followed by the signatures of two witnesses. These witnesses identified their signatures, and that of the maker of the instrument but their
memories were entirely blank concerning the particular instrument. They
testified, however, that it had not been disclosed to them that this paper
was a will. The court held this to be a fatal defect, saying:
26. See Moodie v. Reid, note 6 supra.
See, however, Padgett v. Pence (1915) 178
S. W. 205.
27. (1917) 192 S. W. 956.

28.
29.
1037.

(1919) 216 S. W. 518.
(1918) 275 Mo. 557, 204 S. W.
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"There can be no valid attestation of a will unless the attesting witnesses know at the time that the instrument is being made
and attested as a will."
Three Missouri cases were cited as authority and all of them have
already been considered.
It would appear as if the attorneys for the proponent failed to present properly the question of publication. It was a good opportunity to
have called attention to the fact that generally the statute of frauds and
similar statutes have not been construed to require publication. There
is nothing to indicate that this view was presented to the court.
From the foregoing review this much may be summarized. Missouri
requires publication despite the fact that such a requirement is nowhere
expressly found in the statute, and despite the fact that the contrary is
generally held except where there is a different statutory provision. True,
no decision which has been found has given the matter the proper attention. It is also true that of those who have considered the matter apparently only one judge (Goode) has referred to the statute and pointed
out that the Missouri view is not the orthodox one.
It is believed, however, that in the case under review there was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of publication. The opinion apparently
admits as much provided both witnesses had testified to the existence of
each essential step.
Therefore it becomes pertinent to inquire whether it is necessary for
at least two attesting witnesses to individually testify to the existence of
each step in the proper execution of a will.
In 25 Law Series, p. 60, there was a review of a decision of the Missouri Supreme Court which apparently declared that in a will contest all
the attesting witnesses should testify or be accounted for.' The proposition in question here was given incidental attention.
A further consideration leads to the conclusion that the rule in Missouri is not that each of the attesting witnesses, or even that each of the
necessary attesting witnesses, must testify to existence of al Isteps in the
process of execution."
30. In the review Heinbach v. Heinbach (1918) 274 Mo. 301, 202 S. W. 1123
was overlooked. It is contrary to Rayl v.
Golfinpulos (1921) 233 S. W. 1069 and
Bell v. Smith (1917) 271 Mo. 619, 197 S.
W. 128, unless they are to be distinguished on the basis suggested by White, C.
"Those cases which indicate that one witness is unsufficient are where there is no
other testimony and the absent witness
accounted for." Then the Commissioner
stated that "proof might be made with-

out the presence of either of the subscribing witnesses" - --. Compare Berst v.
Moxom (1911) 157 Mo. App. 342, 138 S.
W. 74.
31. Heinbach v. Heinbach (1918) 274
Mo. 301, 202 S. W. 1123 (Two attest.
ing witnesses; only one called; other in
court room; judgment probating will affirmed. White, C., stated: - - - "even if
they both were present and swore that
the will was not properly executed, it
still might be proved by other sufficient
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Finally, is it necessary to have a request by the testator that the witnesses attest and subscribe the will? It has been pointed out by Williams,
J.," that the true doctrine is that the Missouri statute does not require
any verbal request. "The statute, as above mentioned, merely requires
that the subscribing witnesses sign the will 'in the presence of the testator'. Of course, the word 'presence' necessarily includes knowledge of
the act and acquiescence thereto upon the part of the testator."
Nevertheless, there are plenty of decisions in Missouri wherein the
courts have assumed or held that a request is necessary. But they have
not held that an express request is necessary.
Furthermore, under the
guise of an implied request they have sanctioned situations where there
was nothing more than knowledge and acquiescence on the part of testa5
tor."
In any event in the case under review there seems to have been a
sufficient implied request within the meaning of the Missouri decisions.
This much is apparently admitted in the opinion except that, apparently,
both attesting witnesses did not individually testify to facts showing the
request, and that, therefore, the evidence to show a request was de'ficient.
testimony");

Graham et al. v.

O'Fallon

(1834) 3 Mo. 507 ("One of these witnesses will be enough to establish the due execution of the will if he can prove that he
saw the other witnesses subscribe it in
the testator's presence"); Mays v. Mays
(1893) 114 Mo. 546, 21 S. W. 921 (Only
one attesting witness testified to testamentary capacity. "The law does not place
the validity of these important muniments
of title at the mercy of those who may
be called upon to verify their execution.") ; Craig v. Craig (1900) 156 Mo.
358, 56 S. W. 1097 (One attesting wit.
ness gave sufficient testimony; the mem,
ory of other witness almost blank as to
the presence of testator; probate of will
affirmed); Holmes v. Holloman (1849)
12 Mo. 354 (Both attesting witness parties to record and refused to testify; will
established by other witness); Lorts v.
Walsh (1903) 175 Mo. 487, 75 S. W. 95
(Four witnesses to will); Avaro v. Avaro
(1911) 235 Mo. 424, 138 S. W. 500 ("The
testimony of one witness to that effect
is sufficient to show that the signatures
of two witnesses were placed on the will
to attest it."); Harrell v. Harrell (1920)
284 Mo. 218, 223 S. W. 919 (Strong
opinion by Goode, J.); Southworth v.

Southworth (1903)

173 Mo. 59, 73 S. W.

129 ("The further fact that two of the
three subscribing witnesses to the will, on
the trial, refused to testify that he was
of sound mind at the time the instrument
was executed, was not of itself sufficient
to warrant refusal of probate thereof, if
his testamentary capacity was satisfactorily shown by the other attesting witness,
and evidence aliunde"); Carlson v. Lafgran (1913) 250 Mo. 527, 157 S. W. 555;
Odentvaelder v. Schorr (1880) 8 Mo. App.
458 (Compare Withinton et al v. Withinton et al (1842) 7 Mo. 589).
32. Bingians v. Hannah (1917) 270
Mo. 611, 194 S. W. 276.
33. Pritchard v. Thomas et al. (1917)
192 S. W. 956; Carlson v. Lafgran et al
(1913) 250 Mo. 527, 157 S. W. 555;
Murphy et al. v. Clancy et al (1914) 177
Mo.
App. 429,
163
S. W.
915;
Thomas et al v. English et al (1914) 180
Mo. App. 358, 167 S. W. 1147; Lindsey
v. Stephens (1910) 229 Mo. 600, 129 S.
W. 641; Hughes et al. v. Rader et al.
(1904) 183 Mo. 630; 82 S. W. 32; Martin v. Bowdern (1900) 158 Mo. 379, 59
S. W. 227; Schierbaum et al. v. Schemme
et al. (1900) 157 Mo. 1, 57 S.'W. 526.
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In conclusion, it would seem that the objection to the proponent's
evidence as to formal execution was in the failure of the
nesses to corroborate each other in the essential steps in a
tion. As already stated, there is no such rule in Missouri
believed that there is any need or desire for such a stringent

attesting witproper execuand it is not
requirement.3

K. C. S.
CONVEYANCING-DELIVERY OF DEEDS. Dallas v. McNuit et
al. A woman, who owned certain land, executed a deed of the same to her
nephew, the husband joining. In the instrument it was expressly stated
that the grantors were to enjoy the property during their lives, and when
both were dead, then the deed should be delivered "by whomever shall
get hold of same" to the nephew. The husband, some time later, apparently without the. consent of his wife gave this deed to the cashier of a
bank With instructions to turn it over to the grantee after the death of
himself and wife.
It is essential to the transfer of title by deed that the deed be delivered
Delivery as applied to deeds has a meaning different from the
meaning the word has to the ordinary person for the ordinary legal
meaning involves the idea of the transfer of the possession of the thing
in respect to which the word is used. At one time actual delivery seems
to have been essential to pass title to goods and chattels, while land, not
being capable of manual delivery, was transferred by a ceremony called
livery of seisin,-a sort of symbolical delivery which resulted in the transfer of the possession and of the title if the feoffor had title.' Written evidence of this ceremony was not necessary but it became customary to make
and deliver an instrument called a charter of feoffment,' which had no
effect on the title but was merely legal evidence of what had occurred.
Many of the conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses did not
have to be evidenced by deeds but eventually it came to be the law that
title to real estate could be transferred only by the execution and delivery
of a deed.' The act or series of acts necessary to execute and deliver the
deed had the effect of transferring the title. After the delivery, the deed
is merely evidence of the grantee's title. Probably at first an actual manual handing over of the instrument to the grantee, or to some one for
him, was required in order to have a valid delivery.' But such a transfer
was not effectual to pass title unless the grantor so intended when he made
34. The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of L. E. Atherton, LL. B.
U. of Mo., 1922.
1. (1923) 249 S. W. 35.
2. Williston, Sales, 260.

3.
2 ed.,
4.
5.
6.
1737.

Leake, The Law of Real Property,
32.
Tiffany, Real Property, 2 ed., 1566.
Tiffany, Real Property, 2 ed., 1575.
See Tiffany, Real Property, 2 ed.,
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the delivery. The intention of the grantor has come more and more to be
the controlling element until delivery it seems has come to be purely a
matter of intention.' The word delivery, with this meaning is apt to lead
to confusion, because so different from the meaning of the term as ordinarily understood. According to many authorities delivery as applied to
deeds, means no more than that the grantor intended the instrument to
take effect as his deed
Such intention may be shown by his words,
or his acts, or by both his words and his acts. The usual and customary
mode of delivering a deed, that is, of manifesting the necessary intention
that it take effect, is by the actual handing over of the instrument to the
grantee or to some one for him. Consequently, where it appears that the
grantee has retained possession of the instrument, this fact strongly indicates that he had no intent that it take effect as his deed. No presumption of delivery airses from the fact the alleged grantor executed the instrument;' for delivery is a distinct and separate formality. Hence, strong
evidence of the grantor's intent that the instrument take effect as his
deed, should be required in all cases where he has never parted with control of the instrument. But such evidence may be found in some cases.
So, there are authorities to the effect that a deed may be delivered though
the grantor never parts with control of the instrument." A number of
such cases are in the reports" in Missouri. If this is true, then in cases
where there was no delivery in escrow, dicta like the following (taken
from the decision under review) are apt to mislead :"
"Delivery connotes that the grantor not only parts with all
dominion and control" over the instrument, but that he does so
with the intention that it take effect and pass title as a present
transfer."
Probably the ancestry of statements resembling this is quite ancient
and it may at one time have been a fairly accurate statement of the law
even when there was no delivery in escrow. Now such statements are
7. Devlin, Deeds, 3 ed., 261; Tiffany,
Real Property, 2 ed., 1738; 18 C. J. 201.
Properly speaking the transfer of the instrument to a third party is evidence
bearing on the grantor's intent. It is by
no means conclusive evidence. It is important evidence because this is the customary manner in which the delivery is
made.
8. See collection of cases in Devlin,
Deeds, 3 ed., 261, 18 C. J. 201.
9. Boyd v. Slayback (1883) 63 Cal.
493.
10. See many cases cited in 18 C. J.
201.

11. Burke v. Adams (1883) 80 Mo.
504; Burkey v. Burkey (1915) 175 S. W.
623; Chambers v. Chambers (1910) 227
Mo. 262, 284, 127 S. W. 86; Crowder v.
Searcy (1890) 103 Mo. 97, 117, 15 S. W.
346.
12. Dallas v. McNutt (Mo. Sup.) 249
S. W. 35.
13. "The rule requiring the grantor
to part with all dominion and control
over the deed is not to be construed as
demanding that he must put it beyond
his physical power to procure its possession." Devlin, Deeds, 3 ed., 261, citing
Sneathen v. Sneathen (1891) 104 Mo. 201.
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probably repeated over and over because (since delivery of deeds is
merely evidenced by manual transfer, and handing over seems to conform
to the ordinary legal meaning of the word deliver) the statement at first
reading sounds good and seems sound. Prima facie it seems to be a yard
stick or rule of thumb. The first part of the statement is not accurate if
the cases cited in note ten are the law for it is not necessary that the
grantor part with all control over the instrument. The second part of
the statement is just as doubtful as the first. Suppose the grantor executes a deed of land to his son, and then hands it to a third person with
directions to give it to the son after the grantor's death? There is a good
delivery so far as the grantor is concerned even though the son does not
learn of it until after his father's death." The grantor cannot recall
the deed. He is said to have placed it beyond his dominion and control,
and the first part of the dicta above would be accurate if used in connection with such a state of facts. But does the son get title at once? Does
the grantor intend "that it take effect and pass title as a present transfer"?
It is submitted this is at least an unsettled question in Missouri." Suppose
that A, pursuant to a contract with B, executes a deed to B and delivers
it to a third party with directions to deliver it to B on payment of the
agreed price within a fixed time? Is there a present transfer to B. It is
submitted that B gets no present title though according to the weight
of authority he does have the power to get title by performing the condition."
The decision in the principal case seems sound for there is little or
The suggestion has been made that all
that is meant by parting with all dominion
over the instrument is that the grantor
part with all control over its effective legal
operation-in other words, that the deed
has taken effect and cannot be revoked
by him. This is in effect merely saying
that "part with all dominion and control
over the instrument" does not mean what
it seems to mean but means something
totally different. Thus the rule of law
is changed but courts pretend it is not
changed.
14. Devlin, Deeds, 3 ed., 275c; Meredith v. Meredith (1921) 287 Mo. 250,
229 S. W. 179; White v. Pollock (1893)
117 Mo. 467, 22 S. W. 1077; Crowder v.
Searcy (1890) 103 Mo. 97, 15 S. W. 346.
15. A good discussion is found in Tiffany, Real Property, 2 ed., 1783-1788. A
common theory is that the title remains
in the grantor and passes to the grantee
only on the second delivery after the

grantor's death or, what is more logical,
as soon as the death occurs regardless as
to whether the escrow holder makes delivery or not. In order to defeat heirs,
devises and certain grantees of the grantor, it is said there is a relation back to
the original delivery by the grantor to
It is sometimes said
the escrow holder.
in the second place that title passes to
the grantee on the delivery to the escrow
It has even been said the title
holder.
is in suspense, whatever that may mean.
Space will not permit a discussion of the
merits of these various views. But the
question is not free from difficulty and
seems not to have been settled in MisUnless the second of the above
souri.
theories is adopted the statement in question is not accurate.
16. In some jurisdictions there cannot
be an irrevocable delivery to a third person on a condition to be performed by
the grantee, unless pursuant to a contract

72

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BAR BULLETIN

no evidence that the grantor intended the deed to take effect during her
life time, and while her husband did make what would probably have been
a good delivery in escrow, had he been the grantor, there was no evidence
that he was acting as agent for his wife.
University of Missouri.
For a
which is specifically enforcible.
discussion of the mater see article entitled, "Is a Contract Necessary to Create

J. W. SIMONTON.
an Effective Escrow," in 16 Mich. L. Rev.
569.

